The National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB) held a news conference Friday to discuss its preliminary findings as it wraps up the on-site portion of the investigation into the midair collision between a passenger jet and a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter near Washington, DC, that killed 67 people.
NTSB Chairman Jennifer Homendy offered up a fair bit of new information as she detailed the flight paths of both aircraft as they traversed portions of the Potomac River on the evening of January 29, with the eventual crash taking place near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
Homendy indicated the Black Hawk was on a combined annual instrument and night vision goggle training flight and that, at one point, the pilot and the instructor pilot reported the helicopter being at different altitudes but didn’t discuss the discrepancy.
HOMENDY: This particular, this particular flight was a check ride for the pilot flying the Black Hawk. Generally, a check ride is a practical exam that a pilot must pass to be qualified to perform specific aircrew or mission duties.
The army does 3 types of check rides. Instrument, annual, and night vision goggles. This was a combined annual and night vision goggle check ride. We believe the helicopter crew was likely wearing night vision goggles throughout the flight. Given the nature of the flight.
Per Homendy, the crew was required to discuss removing the night vision goggles before doing so, and no such discussion was picked up on the cockpit recorder. Therefore, it’s almost certain that night vision goggles were being used at the time of the collision.
Homendy detailed the route of the helicopter, which took it north from its home base at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to the Cabin John/American Legion Bridge area of Maryland, where it turned around and headed south. At the same time, the passenger jet was making its way north from the Woodrow Wilson Bridge area of Virginia.
The altitudes of the two aircraft as they continued on the collision course were confirmed by Homendy. As it made its final descent into Reagan National, the passenger jet was at 313 feet, two seconds prior to the crash, and the Black Hawk was at 278 feet at the time of the collision.
Homendy provided a good amount of detail about the Black Hawk’s moves in the minutes leading up to the collision:
HOMENDY: In response, at 8:47:44, the Black Hawk crew indicated that traffic was in sight and requested visual separation, which was approved by DCA [Reagan National] Tower. The instructor pilot then told the pilot flying they believed ATC [air traffic control] was asking for the helicopter to move left toward the east bank of the Potomac.
At 8:47:52 or 7 seconds before impact, the CRJ [passenger jet] rolled out on final for runway 33. The CRJ was at a radio altitude of 344 ft, 143 knots. At 8:47:58 or one second before impact, the CRJ began to increase its pitch, reaching about 9 degrees nose up at the time of collision. FDR [flight data recorder] data show the CRJ elevators were deflected near their maximum nose up travel. The last radio altitude recorded for the CRJ was 313 ft and was recorded 2 seconds prior to the collision. The CRJ pitch at this time was again 9 degrees nose up and roll was 11 degrees left wing down. The CRJ was descending at 448 ft per minute.
The radio altitude of the Black Hawk at the time of the collision was 278 ft and had been steady for the previous 5 seconds. The Blackhawk pitch at the time of the collision was about a half degree nose up with a left roll of 1.6 degrees.
Although the NTSB is confident in the altitude numbers of both aircraft, Homendy cautioned that the Black Hawk’s instruments might not have been showing the crew the same number. The next crucial move for the board will be the physical inspection of the helicopter wreckage, and they are already working in conjunction with Sikorsky, Collins Aviation, and the U.S. Army to determine if the helicopter gauges were malfunctioning.
A final report is not expected for several months.
Nothing new in the latest NTSB report. Based on all tracking databases, the Blackhawk was following the Potomac with an erratic behavior. The flight path as well as well as the altitude was “all over the place”. No need to inspect the wreckage to confirm PAT 25 did not follow accurately Route 1 and Route 4 and failed to stay under 200 ft. The Blackhawk required visual separations when it had no idea about the traffic in and out of Washington National as it had switched-off its ADSB transmitter so had no display of other aircrafts location and course. The last pitch-up of the CRJ must have been done by the copilot who tried to avoid the collision. Sitting in the right seat he must have seen the helicopter surging on starboard side. Being on short final their attention was on the approach lights and VASI and make sure there was no intrusion on the runway. Even by pulling the nose up the crew could not avoid the collision because jet engines need time to spool-up to maximum thrust. This time may be 6 to 8 seconds.